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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-THE EFFECT OF MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LOHR
ON THIRD CIRCUIT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION: MEDICAL
DEVICE AMENDMENTS DO NOT PRE-EMPT STATE LAW
TORT CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
A disturbing reality of products liability law before 1996 was that the
United States Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") approval of a drug
or device could preclude an injured plaintiff from collecting damages
from the manufacturer under common law tort theories.1 This fact re-
sulted from the statutory language and judicial interpretation of the 1976
Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
("MDA"). 2 The amended statute expressly states Congress' intent that no
1. See Suzanne Darrow Kleinhaus, Medtronic v. Lohr: For Want of a Word, the
Patient was Almost Lost-Fixing the Mischief Caused in Cipollone by Dividing the Pre-
emption Stream, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 297, 314 (1998) (assessing impact of 1996
decision by Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr); Rachel Tumidolsky, How
Medtronic v. Lohr has Redefined Medical Device Regulation and Litigation, 65 DEF.
COUNS. J. 268, 268 (1998) (stating "[s]tate law tort claims will no longer be pre-
empted by the Medical Devices Amendments, and manufacturers now are faced
with state product liability," and attributing change to Supreme Court's 1996 rul-
ing). After extensive analysis of the Supreme Court's holding in Medtronic, one
commentator assessed its impact, stating "[s] ince Medtronic, however, plaintiffs pre-
viously denied recovery under state tort law causes of action have claimed that the
Supreme Court has effectively overturn [ed] all of the cases which made the ...
conclusion that common law claims were requirements different or in addition to
federal regulations... ." Kleinhaus, supra, at 34.
2. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994) (declar-
ing pre-emptive effect of regulations stated in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act pertaining to medical devices); see generally Brian J. Donato & Mary Beth Ner-
aas, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Claims Involving Drugs and Medical Devices
Regulated Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 305,
308-11 (1993) (summarizing analysis applied by circuit courts of appeals that have
held federal law pre-empts state tort claims involving medical devices); Nancy K
Plant, Federal Preemption of State Law Tort Claims Under the Medical Device Amendments
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 2 Fall WIDENER L. SvMP.J. 87, 87-89 (1996)
(presenting defendant's arguments regarding pre-emption of state law tort claims
under MDA).
Provisions of the MDA that are pertinent to this issue provide:
§ 360k. State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or polit-
ical subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect
to a device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement appli-
cable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which related to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
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state may establish requirements applicable to medical devices that are dif-
ferent from, or in addition to, any federal requirements. 3 Although fed-
eral courts have varied in their readings of this statute, many courts have
interpreted it to pre-empt state tort law remedies for plaintiffs if the FDA
had approved the device at issue. 4 Such tort law claims pre-empted under
this assumption included negligence, strict liability, misrepresentation and
so-called "fraud on the FDA" claims.
5
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity
for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under
such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement
of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for
human use if -
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this
chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption
were not in effect under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement -
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the de-
vice to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this
chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k. For further discussion of the MDA, see infra notes 21-38 and
accompanying text.
3. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994) (articulating express pre-emption provisions
pertaining to Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
4. SeeJean M. Eggen, Sense or Sensibility ?: Toxic Product Liability Under State Law
After Cipollone and Medtronic, 2 WIDENER L. SymP. J. 1, 22-26 (1997) (discussing
various circuit courts' holdings regarding interpretation of "requirement" as used
in Medical Device Amendments); see, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc.,
70 F.3d 39, 41 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We now join the majority of circuits and hold that
§ 360k(a) of the MDA expressly preempts plaintiffs' state law product liability
claims."), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1030 (1996); Becker v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 20 n.2 (2d Cir. 1995) ("It is now well established that a 'require-
ment' for purposes of the preemption provision of the MDA may be created by
state common law as well as by statutory law."); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co.,
65 F.3d 392, 397-98 (4th Cir. 1995) (concluding that state law claims may impose
requirements within meaning of § 360k), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1030
(1996); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1323 (3d Cir. 1995) ("We have al-
ready determined that the term "requirements" as used in § 360k encompasses
state common law claims."); Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1168 (8th
Cir. 1994) ("Thus, the MDA's preemptive effect extends to state tort actions.");
Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (5th Cir. 1993) ("We likewise
must reject Stamps's argument that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort
law remedies when it enacted the MDA."); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130,
1134 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that state requirement "may emanate from any re-
quirement established by a state including statutes, regulations, court decisions or
ordinances"); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding "Investigational Device Exemption Regulations" for intraocular
lenses preempted claims).
5. See, e.g., Becker, 66 F.3d at 18 (finding MDA pre-emption in products liabil-
ity action for defective design, defective manufacture, failure to warn and failure to
test); Duval4 65 F.3d at 392, 395 (finding MDA pre-emption of state law claims for
strict liability in defective design, defective manufacture, failure to warn and claims
for negligence in marketing, testing, promotion and sale of product).
874
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss5/3
CASEBRIEF
In Medtronic v. Lohr 6 the Supreme Court of the United States sought
to answer this pre-emption question definitively-ruling that the state law
claims at issue in that case were not pre-empted by the MDA. 7 This pro-
nouncement by the Court prompted lower courts throughout the country
not only to treat the issue differently in the future, but also to reconsider
cases decided contrary to Medtronic.8 In addition, the ruling has changed
the litigation landscape for developers and manufacturers of drugs and
medical devices.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consid-
ered the pre-emption question as well.10 With its recent decision in In re
Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation," a divided panel ex-
tended the Medtronic rule and allowed state law tort claims. 12 Specifically,
the court held that a fraud on the FDA claim, if properly pleaded, might
not be pre-empted by the MDA.13 This pronouncement overruled the
Third Circuit's 1995 decision in Michael v. Shiley, Inc.,14 in which the court
found that the MDA pre-empts any state law claims. 15 The court's ruling
6. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
7. See id. at 503 ("Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is re-
versed insofar as it held that any of the claims were pre-empted [by the MDA] and
affirmed insofar as it rejected the pre-emption defense.").
8. See Quentin F. Urquhart, Jr. & Robert E. Durgin, Medtronic v. Lohr: Is
There a Future for Preemption in Medical Device Cases?, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 45, 51-55
(1997) (discussing effects of Medtronic on litigation involving 510(k) devices,
premarket approval devices and investigational device exemption devices); Mark
E. Gelsinger, Note, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Is Federal Pre-Emption a Heartbeat Away
from Death Under the Medical Device Amendments?, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 647, 647 (1998)
(exploring historical, judicial and social ramifications of Supreme Court's Med-
tronic decision).
9. See Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 268 (attributing changes in medical device
regulation and litigation to Medtronic); Urquhart & Durgin, supra note 8, at 51-55
(discussing effects of Medtronic on litigation involving 510(k) devices, premarket
approval devices and investigational device exemption devices); Gelsinger, supra
note 8, at 676-78 (assessing impact of Medtronic on medical devices industry).
10. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 825 (3d
Cir. 1998) (finding that Medtronic counsels rejection of defendant's pre-emption
arguments and holding that state law of fraudulent misrepresentation would not
be pre-empted by MDA).
11. 159 F.3d 817 (3d Cir. 1998).
12. See id. at 825-26 (addressing defendant's pre-emption arguments by citing
Medtronic as controlling authority and finding defendant's arguments
unpersuasive).
13. See id. at 829. The court stated:
Rather, we hold that (1) the plaintiffs' "fraud on the FDA" theory of lia-
bility is not so at odds with traditional principles of tort law that Buckman
is entided to a dismissal of all claims against it at this stage; and (2) if the
state law of fraudulent misrepresentation applicable in one or more of
these cases would impose liability on Buckman in the circumstances al-
leged, that law would not be pre-empted by the MDA.
Id.
14. 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995).
15. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d 817 at 825 (finding Medtronic controlling
and noting "[i]n short, Lohr overruled everything in Michael that would prevent a
1999]
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in Shiley was consistent-with Third Circuit precedent. 16 With Bone Screw
Litigation, the Third Circuit has clearly stated its current rule on MDA pre-
emption.
17
This Casebrief discusses the development of law in the Third Circuit
concerning liability under state tort law of drug and medical device manu-
facturers for products that were approved by the FDA, considered in light
of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. Part II summarizes federal
regulation of drugs and medical devices, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Medtronic and the effect of this ruling on cases in other circuit courts of
appeals.' 8 Part III traces the evolution of the Third Circuit's approach to
state law tort claims vis-a-vis the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.19
Ultimately, this Casebrief focuses upon the Third Circuit's recent pro-
nouncement in Bone Screw Litigation, which held that the Medical Device
Amendments would not pre-empt any viable state law claim and that
fraudulent misrepresentation to the FDA could be the proximate cause of
injuries allegedly sustained by patients. 20
II. BACKGROUND
A. FDA Regulation of Medical Devices
A preliminary discussion of FDA regulatory procedure is necessary to
provide the context for the specific pre-emption question recently ad-
dressed by the Third Circuit. With the passage of the MDA in 1976, Con-
gress granted the FDA regulatory authority over medical devices prior to
their introduction to the market.2 ' The statute comprehensively defines
"medical device." 22 As a result, medical devices may include any article
plaintiff from pursuing a cause of action ... based on common law principles");
Michael v. Shiley, 46 F.3d 1316, 1324 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that regulations
under common law, even if they do "not rise to the level of specificity present in
the case of some other devices regulated by the FDA," they do present "specific
requirements applicable to a particular device under the act").
16. See Shiley, 46 F.3d at 1323 (finding discussion of whether state common
law imposes "requirements" in § 360k unnecessary because of Third Circuit's ear-
lier ruling in Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541-42 (3d Cir. 1994)).
17. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 825, 829 (stating "[iln short, Lohr
overrules everything in Michael that would prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a
cause of action ... based on common law principles" and holding fraud claim not
pre-empted if applicable).
18. For further discussion of federal regulation of drugs and devices, the
Supreme Court's holding in Medtronic and its effect in other circuit courts, see infra
notes 21-76 and accompanying text.
19. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of state law tort
claims vis-a-vis the MDA, see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
20. For further discussion of the Third Circuit's recent pronouncement in
Bone Screw Litigation, see infra notes 82-124 and accompanying text.
21. See Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 268 (providing history of MDA).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994) (defining "medical device"). Provisions of
the MDA that are pertinent to this issue provide:
(h) The term "device" (except when used in paragraph (n) of this section
and in sections 331 (i), 343(f), 352(c), and 362(c) of this title) means an
4
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that is officially recognized in a national register, is meant to be used for a
medical purpose and does not rely on chemical action to achieve its in-
tended effect. 23 Prompted by increased technological complexity of de-
vices and mounting disclosures of shortcomings involving pacemakers,
intrauterine devices and intraocular lenses, Congress responded by enact-
ing the MDA to "provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
intended for human use."24 Recognized purposes of the MDA were to:
"(1) assure public protection against unsafe and ineffective devices, (2)
ensure that health practitioners could be confident about the medical
equipment they prescribed for their patients, and (3) provide market pro-
tection for pioneers of new technologies."25
Concurrently, Congress created a three-class system in order to
achieve effective regulation of the various materials within the statute.26
Class I devices are the least restricted of the three and are subject to regu-
lation regarding issues such as misbranding, banning, premarket notifica-
tion, restrictions on sale or distribution and reporting of adverse
experiences.2 7 Class II devices are those that require a greater degree of
regulation than Class I devices and about which there is sufficient informa-
tion available for the FDA to formulate a mandatory standard for the de-
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vi-
tro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component,
part, or accessory, which is-
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United
States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in
man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals, and which does not achieve its primary in-
tended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of
man or other animals and which is not dependent upon being me-
tabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
23. See id. (listing what constitutes "medical device").
24. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996) (describing policy motivation
for enactment of MDA); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d
817, 819 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Congress enacted the MDA to address concerns regard-
ing the safety and effectiveness of the wide variety of medical devices introduced
into the market.").
25. James S. Benson et al., The FDA's Regulation of Medical Devices: A Decade of
Change, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 495, 497 (1988) (summarizing legislative intent
in enacting MDA).
26. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 819 ("The MDA requires classification
of medical devices into three categories based upon the risk that they pose to the
public."). For the full text of classification of medical devices intended for human
use, see 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1994).
27. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 55 (1976) (explaining conference committee
substitute regarding Class I devices); Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 269 (detailing
"general controls" regulation of Class I devices).
5
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vice. 28 Oxygen masks are an example of Class II devices.29 Class III
devices require premarket approval by the FDA-a long and comprehen-
sive process-because the standards for both Class I and Class II are inade-
quate.30 Class III devices include breast implants, pacemakers and other
prosthetic and implantable devices. 31
There are two situations in which a Class III device may be marketed
without being subjected to the extensive premarket approval process.3 2
First, under the "investigational device exemption," the FDA will approve
an experiment involving an unapproved device, thereby allowing the de-
vice to be used in human beings to collect data.3 3 The second possibility is
to claim that the device is "substantially equivalent" to a pre-existing device
on the market and thus avoid the premarket approval process by applying
for FDA approval under the so-called "510(k) mechanism." 34 Obtaining
approval of a device by this method-claiming that the device is substan-
tially equivalent to a device pre-dating the MDA-is the most efficient way
to market a medical device.3 5 If a manufacturer seeks approval of a device
using the 510(k) process, the company should first notify the FDA of this
intention.3 6 After receiving this notice, the FDA has ninety days to object;
28. See S. RFP. No. 94-33, at 55 (explaining conference committee substitute
regarding Class II devices); Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 269 (distinguishing Class
II devices from Class I devices).
29. See Gelsinger, supra note 8, at 654 n.59.
30. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 55-56 (defining Class III devices as those that are
"purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life
or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health or which present a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury");
Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 269 (explaining deficiencies of Class I and Class II
standards for Class III devices).
31. See Gelsinger, supra note 8, at 654 n.60 ("Class III devices include pace-
makers (at issue in Medtronic), breast implants, and intrauterine contraceptive
devices.").
32. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 819-20
(3d Cir. 1998) (discussing exceptions to full premarket approval process).
33. See Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 269-70 ("Some devices are marketed
under an investigational device exemption (IDE), which is an FDA-approved ex-
periment that allows an unapproved device to be used in human beings in order to
collect data.").
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (1) (B) (1994) (allowing for devices that are "sub-
stantially equivalent" to pre-existing devices in order to avoid the premarket ap-
proval process); see also Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 819-20 (explaining
exception known as "510(k) process"); Benson et al., supra note 25, at 513 (ex-
plaining "substantially equivalent" exception).
35. See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1996) (comparing number
of hours necessary to complete full premarket approval process with 510(k) pro-
cess); Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 270 (noting that 510(k) mechanism enables
marketing at great speed and efficiency).
36. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 819-20 (noting "[flor a device to be
approved under the § 510(k) process, the FDA must determine that the new de-
vice has the same intended use as the predicate device . . . ."); Tumidolsky, supra
note 1, at 270 (explaining 510(k) process in full).
878 [Vol. 44: p. 873
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if no objection is made, the company may market the device.3 7 In addi-
tion, the actual time required for FDA review of a 510(k) application is a
mere fraction of the time necessary for review of a full premarket approval
application.3 8
B. The 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938: Pre-emption of State Requirements
After the MDA was enacted in 1976, there remained some degree of
uncertainty regarding its pre-emptive effect.39 The language of the statute
appears comprehensive-stating simply that no state shall establish any
requirement that is different from, or in addition to, the requirements
imposed by the FDA.40 The question among the judiciary became focused
on the meaning of the word "requirement."41
The doctrine of federal pre-emption permits federal law to pre-empt
state law in three ways: by express provision, by precluding state regulation
in the field or by conflicting with state law.4 2 In the first instance, the
express words of the statute or accompanying legislative history articulate
congressional intent to pre-empt state law and the degree to which this
pre-emption occurs. 43 In the second instance, congressional intent to pre-
37. See Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 270 (charting time frame for 510(k)
approval).
38. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 478-79 (comparing number of hours necessary to
complete full premarket approval process with 510(k) process).
39. See Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The
Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REv. 895, 916 (1994) (noting that Supreme Court's
ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), was necessary to calm
confusion regarding interpretation of MDA).
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994) (prescribing specific pre-emptive effect of
regulations stated in Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act pertaining to medical devices);
see also Plant, supra note 2, at 87-88 (introducing discussion of possible federal pre-
emption of tort claims with close inspection of statute's language).
41. See Plant, supra note 2, at 88 (focusing discussion of pre-emption on spe-
cific issue of interpreting word "requirement"); see also Eggen, supra note 4, at 1
(noting that all but one of federal appeals courts have determined that "require-
ment" can apply to state law tort claims in addition to statutory and regulatory
actions).
42. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98
(1992) (stating "[p]re-emption may be either expressed or implied" and recogniz-
ing two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption and conflict pre-emption);
Beverly L. Jacklin, Federal Pre-Emption of State Common-Law Products Liability Claims
Pertaining to Drugs, Medical Devices, and Other Health-Related Items, 98 A.L.R. FED. 124
§ 2 (1990 & Oct. 1998 Supp.) (providing general background information on fed-
eral pre-emption of state laws).
43. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (stating recognized propositions of Court's pre-
emption jurisprudence); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (articulating instances in
which federal law would pre-empt state law). The Court explained:
It is well-established that within Constitutional limits Congress may pre-
empt state authority by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit pre-
emptive language, Congress' intent to supercede state law altogether may
be found from a "scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make
7
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empt state law may be implied in the statute because of the particularly
federal nature of the policy matter.44 In the third instance, the federal
statute may directly conflict with a state statute, in whole or in part, thus
making compliance with both statutes an impossibility. 45 The federal gov-
ernment's pre-emptive power is not limited to statutes and their legislative
history; in addition, the United States Constitution, treaties and federal
administrative regulations might have a pre-emptive effect.46 Accordingly,
federal authority may pre-empt any of several types of state authority, such
as a state's common law, which serves as controlling authority in product
liability and related tort claims. 47
If the federal authority at issue in a case does not expressly indicate its
pre-emptive effect, the court must make an independent determination of
any such effect.48 Courts typically consider several factors when ruling in
pre-emption cases: (1) the legislative purpose and intent of Congress as
indicated by the language of the statute, accompanying reports and other
available legislative history; (2) the pervasive nature of the federal regula-
tory scheme as evidenced by the statute and ensuing administrative inter-
pretation; (3) the nature of the regulated field and the extent to which
uniform and exclusively federal regulation is vital to the national interest;
and (4) whether-in the particular case under consideration-a state law
hinders the complete execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to sup-
plement it," "because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," or because "the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obli-
gations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose." Even where Con-
gress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state
law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.
Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and state regu-
lations is a physical impossibility," or where state law "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."
Id. at 203-04 (citations omitted).
44. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04 (articulating instances in which federal
law would pre-empt state law). For the full text of the Supreme Court's explana-
tion of the types of pre-emption, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
45. See id.
46. See Donato & Neraas, supra note 2, at 313 (supporting analysis of First
Circuit's decision in King with general discussion of federal pre-emption doctrine
and citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 694 (1984)).
47. See id. at 313 (describing various state sources of authority that might be
found to be pre-empted by federal authorities and citing San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). In Garmon, the Court concluded that
state action "to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm" can
be pre-empted by conflicting with federal law. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.
48. See, e.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 98-99 (stating "[o ] ur ultimate task in any pre-
emption case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent with the struc-
ture and purpose of the statute as a whole" and considering objective and policy of
federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970).
[Vol. 44: p. 873
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gress. 49 Courts may apply one or all of these factors to discern the pre-
emptive effect of a statute.
50
Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Medtronic, nearly every court to
consider the pre-emptive effect of the MDA found that it pre-empted com-
mon law tort claims. 51 Accordingly, nine of the federal courts of appeals
held that the MDA may pre-empt common law tort claims. 52 In addition,
the majority of federal trial courts also held that the MDA has this pre-
emptive effect. 53 Incidentally, most state courts to consider the issue
49. SeeJacklin, supra note 42, at § 2 (describing four factors employed by fed-
eral courts in determining pre-emptive effect of legislation); see generally Abbot v.
American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying pre-
emption analysis and considering various factors to discern congressional intent
and purpose).
50. SeeJacklin, supra note 42, at § 2 (explaining that courts may apply one or
more of standard factors in ruling on pre-emption).
51. See Mark Herrman & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Preemption and Medical Devices: A
Response to Adler and Mann, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 1 (1996) (assessing judicial
interpretation of MDA's pre-emptive effect). For a discussion of pre-Medtronicju-
risprudence, see supra notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text.
52. See Hermann & Ritts, supra note 51, at 1-2 n.4 (considering circuit court
treatment of MDA pre-emption and listing decisions in which courts found state
law remedies pre-empted); see, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d
39, 41 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding MDA pre-empts certain common law claims);
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); English v.
Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Becker v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 19 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65
F.3d 392, 395 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 26 (1st
Cir. 1995) (same); Feldt v. Mentor Corp. 61 F.3d 431, 433 n.2, 436-38 (5th Cir.
1995) (same); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1319 (3d Cir. 1995) (same);
Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Martello v.
CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); National Bank of
Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 999 (8th Cir. 1994) (Loken, J.,
concurring) (same); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541 (3d Cir.
1994) (same); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) (same);
Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194, 195 (11th Cir. 1994) (same); Stamps v. Colla-
gen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); King v. Collagen Corp.,
983 F.2d 1130, 1131 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961
F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
53. See Hermann & Ritts, supra note 51, at 1-2 n.5 (assessing federal district
court holdings and listing cases finding MDA pre-emption of state law claims); see,
e.g., Blanchard v. Collagen Corp., 909 F. Supp. 427, 429-30 (E.D. La. 1995) (hold-
ing that MDA pre-empted certain common law tort claims); Mastrangelo v.
Howmedica, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 439, 443 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (same); Chadwell v. Opti-
cal Radiation Corp., 902 F. Supp. 830, 835-36 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (same); Dow v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 899 F. Supp. 822, 823 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); Fender v.
Medtronic, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Caraballo v.
Intermedics, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 974, 975 (D.P.R. 1995) (same); Dawson v.
Howmedica, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1402, 1407-08 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (same); Petix v.
Kabi Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 92, 93 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (same);
Richman v. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 895, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(same); LeMay v. Eli Lilly & Co., 881 F. Supp. 428, 430 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (same);
Bokis v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 748, 756 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (same);
Richardson v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. CIVA 94-1926, 1995 WL
15199, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 1995) (same); Strong v. Telectronics Pacing Sys.,
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agreed with the federal decisions that pre-empted state common law.5 4
Thus the MDA was generally recognized to pre-empt some common law
Inc., 891 F. Supp. 401, 403 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (same); Guzman v. Intermedics, Inc,
No. 92-CV-77242, 1994 WL 792590, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 1994) (same); Burnett
v. Pfizer, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 25, 25 (E.D. Ky. 1994) (same); Ministry of Health v.
Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1437-39 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (same); Kemp v. Pfizer
Inc., 851 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (same); Tucker v. Collagen Corp.,
No. 93-C-2375, 1994 WL 87367, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1994) (same); Bravman v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (same); Griffin v.
Medtronic Inc., 840 F. Supp. 396, 397 (D. Md. 1994) (same); Angelle v. In-
termedics Intraocular, Inc., No. CIV.A.93-0403, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17805, at
*16-24 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1993) (same); Lewis v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc.,
No.CIV. A.93-0007, 1993 WL 533976, at *8-9 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1993) (same); Mur-
ray v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 93-1196, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17476, at *5 (E.D. La.
Dec. 3, 1993) (same); Bollier v. Medtronic, Inc., No. CIV.A.H-92-2439, 1993 WL
734843, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1993) (same); Schubert v. Medtronic, Inc., No.
CIV.A.92-2967, 1993 WL 390110, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 1993) (same); Sloman v.
Tambrands, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (D. Md. 1993) (same); Kemp v. Pfizer
Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015, 1025 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (same); Flynn v. Biomet, Inc., No.
CIV.A.3:93CV192, 1993 WL 540570, at *6 (E.D. Va.July 23, 1993) (same); Brudnok
v. Tambrands, Inc. No. 92-693-JU, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19189, at *3-4 (D. Or.
Mar. 24, 1993) (same); Cameron v. Howmedica, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 317, 321 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (same); Corey v. International Playtex, No. 92 C 5778, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 527, at *7-9 (N.D. Ill.Jan. 21, 1993) (same); Covey v. Surgidev Corp., 815 F.
Supp. 1089, 1095-96 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (same), affd, 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993);
Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744,. 751-55 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (same),
affd, 5 F.3d 1489 (3d. Cir. 1993); Truxillo v. Ray-Ban, No. 91-1558, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12210, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1992) (same), affid, 14 F.3d 55 (5th Cir.
1994).
54. See Hermann & Ritts, supra note 51, at 2-3 n.6 (surveying state court deci-
sions on MDA pre-emption of state law claims and listing decisions finding tort
claims pre-empted); see, e.g., Powers v. Optical Radiation Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
485, 487 (Ct. App. 1995) (same) (later de-published by California Supreme
Court); Scott v. CIBA Vision Corp., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that MDA pre-empted common law tort claim); Evraets v. Intermedics
Intraocular, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 854 (Ct. App. 1994) (same); Messina v.
Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., No. 92C-01-018, 1994 WL 750318, at *2-3 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 1994) (same); Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 526, 528
(Ga. 1991) (same); Niehoff v. Surgidev Corp., No. 94-CA-0262-MR, 1995 WL
794203 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1995) (same); Sylvester v. Mentor Corp., 663 So. 2d
176, 181-83 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (same), writ denied, 667 So. 2d 1052 (La. 1996);
Rutland v. Mentor Corp., No. 20235, 1994 WL 454741, at *1 (Miss. Cir. Feb. 23,
1994) (same); Stefl v. Medtronic, Inc., 916 S.W.2d 879, 880-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(same); Connelly v. Iolab Corp., No. WD49377, 1995 WL 250794, at *9 (Mo. Ct.
App. May 2, 1995) (same); Ambrosio v. Barnes Hind, Inc., 625 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742
(App. Div. 1995) (same); Berger v. Medtronic, Inc., 623 N.Y.S.2d 985, 989-90 (Sup.
Ct. 1995) (same); Lulov v. Tambrands, Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207 (App. Div.
1993) (same); Klein v. Biscup, 673 N.E.2d 225, 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (same);
Mears v. Marshall, 905 P.2d 1154, 1158 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (same); Burgstahler v.
AcroMed Corp., 670 A.2d 658, 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (same); Rosci v. AcroMed
Corp., 669 A.2d 959, 966-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (same); Green v. Dolsky, 641
A.2d 600, 606-07 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), allocatur granted, 652 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1994)
(same); Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 921 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(same).
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claims, and the debate focused on the scope of this pre-emption. 55 As a
result, some courts held that the FDA process used for approval of the
device determines the effect of pre-emption. 56 Others held that the ex-
tent of pre-emption varied depending on the classification of the device.
5 7
Still others held that the existence of specific state and/or federal regula-
tions were controlling.
5 8
55. See Herrman & Ritts, supra note 51, at 2-3 ("For the most part, the battles
in the courts have been over the scope of preemption, not whether preemption
exists at all.").
56. See id. at 3 n.7 (providing examples of courts allowing state law claims
when device was cleared under premarket notification process and citing Larsen v.
Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1281-82 (Haw. 1992) and Fogal v. Steinfeld, 620
N.Y.S.2d 875, 882-83 (Sup. Ct. 1994)); see also Donato & Neraas, supra note 2, at
314-15 (suggesting that premarket approval is prerequisite for pre-emption).
57. See Hermann & Ritts, supra note 51, at 3-4, 3 n.8 (assessing whether there
is difference in pre-emption decisions of cases litigating tort claims involving Class
II and Class III devices and listing examples of decisions); see, e.g., Ginochio v.
Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948, 950-51 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (finding no pre-emption
in case involving Class II premarket notification); Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson,
Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251, 252 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (allowing state law claim absent evi-
dence of premarket notification); Parenteau v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics
Inc., 856 F. Supp. 61, 65 (D.N.H. 1994) ("[T]he general controls to which all Class
II devices are subject, do not regulate the design of the knee prosthesis at issue.
Accordingly . . . plaintiffs' state-law claims are not preempted under section
360k(a)."); Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D. Ind. 1994) (find-
ing pre-emption for Class III, but not Class II, device components approved by
premarket notification and noting "[t] herefore, as to the Class III devices at issue,
plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs argument is more persuasive when
applied to the Class II device at issue"); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 905,
907 (D. Colo. 1994) (concluding no pre-emption in claim involving Class III
premarket notification); Elbert v. Howmedica, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D. Haw.
1993) (finding no pre-emption), affd, 59 F.3d 174 (9th Cir. 1995). But see, e.g., In
re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014 No. CIV.A.93-7074,
1995 WL 273600, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 1995) ("The court ... follows the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Reeves v. Acromed Corp., that plaintiffs' 'attempt to distinguish
this case on the basis of the type of FDA approval process at issue is unpersua-
sive.'") (citations omitted).
58. See Hermann & Ritts, supra note 51, at 3-4, 4 n.9 (citing examples of deci-
sions holding that plaintiffs may recover under state tort law if defendants do not
meet federal requirements); see, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding "when a statute only
preempts state requirements that are different from or in addition to those im-
posed by federal law, plaintiffs may still recover under state tort law when defend-
ants fail to comply with the federal requirements"); Parenteau, 856 F. Supp. at 64-65
(D.N.H. 1994) ("Where specific FDA regulations regarding the design of a particu-
lar medical device have not been found, state-law claims of defective design are not
preempted under section 360k(a) of the MDA."); Lance v. American Edwards
Labs., 452 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. App. 1994) (denying defendants' argument that
plaintiff's duty to warn claim was pre-empted by MDA after finding no federal
provision imposing duty to warn).
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C. The Supreme Court Speaks on MBA Pre-emption: Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr
Four years before the Supreme Court's ruling regarding the pre-emp-
tive effect of the MDA in Medtronic, the Court considered pre-emption in
the context of another federal statute, the Public Health Cigarette Smok-
ing Act of 1969. 5 9 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,60 the Court held that
"requirement" as used in an express pre-emption statute-such as the
MDA-might include other state authority besides statutes and regula-
tions-this statutory language "easily encompass[es] obligations that take
the form of common law rules."6 ' Thus, state law tort claims were held to
be pre-empted by that federal statute.6 2
The Supreme Court sought to resolve the pre-emption question re-
garding the MDA in Medtronic, a case involving a manufacturer of a pace-
maker that had been cleared by the FDA as a Class II device under
§ 510(k). 63 The plaintiff sought damages for defendant's alleged com-
mon law negligence and strict liability, pertaining to the design of the de-
vice; the plaintiff raised additional common law claims on theories of
defective manufacturing and mislabeling of the device. 64 Defendant ar-
59. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1994) (requiring, among other things, that some sort of warning appear in promi-
nent place on every package of cigarettes sold in United States).
60. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
61. Id. at 505; see Herrmann & Ritts, supra note 51, at 6-7 (citing Cipollone as
example of statutory interpretation based on ordinary meaning of Congress' lan-
guage and stating "[a]pplying the 'ordinary meaning' of the language of statutes
such as [the Medical Device Amendments], courts regularly find preemption of
common law tort claims"-prior to Supreme Court's ruling in Medtronic).
62. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31 (summarizing holding). The Court con-
cluded with the following recapitulation of their holdings:
The 1965 Act did not pre-empt state law damages actions; the 1969 Act
pre-empts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the neutrali-
zation of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely
on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the
1969 Act does not pre-empt petitioner's claims based on express war-
ranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.
Id.
63. See Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 480 (1996) ("As have so many other
medical device manufacturers, petitioner Medtronic took advantage of § 510(k)'s
expedited process in October of 1982, when it notified FDA that it intended to
market its Model 4011 pacemaker lead as a device that was 'substantially
equivalent' to devices already on the market.").
64. See id. at 481 (cataloguing claims made in plaintiffs' complaint). The
court so recounted the complaint:
Their complaint contained both a negligence count and a strict liability
count. The negligence count alleged a breach of Medtronic's "duty to
use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the
subject pacemaker" in several respects, including the use of defective
materials in the lead and a failure to warn or properly instruct the plain-
tiff or her physicians of the tendency of the pacemaker to fail, despite
knowledge of other earlier failures. The strict liability count alleged that
the device was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to
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gued that the MDA pre-empted any state law claims; the Supreme Court,
however, disagreed. 65 The Court interpreted the MDA pre-emption provi-
sions narrowly by emphasizing several factors that must be present in or-
der to find pre-emption: (1) the state requirement must be "with respect
to" the device and relate "to the safety or effectiveness of the device;" (2)
the specific federal requirement must be "applicable to the device" in
question; (3) the state requirement must be "different from, or in addition
to" federal requirements; and (4) the federal requirements must be "spe-
cific counterpart regulations" or "specific" to a "particular device." 66 The
Court held that nothing in the pre-emption provision of the MDA denies
states the right to provide traditional damages remedies for violations of
common law or state tort law duties.
67
D. Circuit Court Reaction to Medtronic
The circuit courts considering the pre-emptive effect of the MDA ap-
ply the rule announced in Medtronic unevenly, and several of the courts
have yet to rule.68 Some courts apply Medtronic's principle by analogy to
other federal statutes, including those that regulate insecticides, animal
inspections and flammable fabrics. 69 The decisions regarding federal stat-
utes other than the MDA, however, are too inconsistent to conclude that
foreseeable users at the time of its sale. (A third count alleging breach of
warranty was dismissed for failure to state a claim under Florida law.)
Id. (citations omitted).
65. See id. at 486-87 (rejecting arguments made by Medtronic). In response to
Medtronic's argument that the negligent design claim should have been pre-
empted by the MDA, the Court stated that "Medtronic's argument is not only unper-
suasive, it is implausible." Id. at 487.
66. See id. at 500 (explaining MDA's "overarching concern that pre-emption
occur only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a spe-
cific federal interest").
67. See id. at 491 ("There is, to the best of our knowledge, nothing in the
hearings, the committee reports, or the debates suggesting that any proponent of
the legislation intended a sweeping pre-emption of traditional common-law reme-
dies against manufacturers and distributors of defective devices.").
68. Compare Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 104 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that plaintiff may state claim under tort theories in light of Med-
tronic), with Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1099 (6th Cir.
1997) (analyzing case in light of Medtronic and concluding that manufacturing and
design defect claims were pre-empted).
69. See Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding that state law claims were pre-empted by Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service Regulations); Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656,
660-61 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that manufacturer might raise claim that Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act pre-empted claims); Grenier v. Ver-
mont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 564-65 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act pre-empted builder's failure to warn
claims); Wilson v. Bradlees, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 553 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that
Flammable Fabrics Act did not pre-empt common-law products liability claims).
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the Medtronic principle will control future rulings on the pre-emptive effect
of any such regulatory statute.70
The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits hold
that the MDA may have a pre-emptive effect when a plaintiff brings an
action under a state law tort claim. 71 Courts distinguish Medtronic by vari-
ous means, such as emphasizing the differences between federal regula-
tion of pacemakers (the product in Medtronic) and the product at issue in
a particular case. 72 In addition, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Sev-
enth and Eighth Circuits hold that other federal statutes may have a pre-
emptive effect on certain state law claims. 73
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits hold that state tort law claims might lie pursuant to the
Supreme Court's Medtronic ruling.7 4 Most courts state simply that Med-
tronic controls the decision, leaving no alternative but to allow common
law claims. 75 Further, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit holds that
another federal statute, the Flammable Fabrics Act, does not pre-empt cer-
tain state law tort claims.
76
70. For a comparison of two cases reaching opposite conclusions after consid-
ering plaintiffs' tort claims in light of Medtronic, see supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text.
71. See Telectronics, 105 F.3d at 1099 (analyzing case in light of Medtronic and
concluding manufacturing and design defect claims pre-empted); see also Mitchell
v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 902, 913-14 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that FDA's
premarket approval can have pre-emptive effect); Papike v. Tambrands, 107 F.3d
37, 738 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding plaintiff's various negligence claims pre-empted
by MDA).
72. See Papike, 107 F.3d at 742 (distinguishing Medtronic accordingly, "[t]his
result is entirely consistent with Medtronic, which did not involve device-specific
federal requirements").
73. For a catalogue of cases involving pre-emption and other federal statutes,
see supra note 69.
74. See Norgaard v. DePuy Orthopedics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1074, 1075, 1078 (7th
Cir. 1997) (affirming lower court's decision because plaintiff failed to make timely
appeal based on Medtronic); Martin v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 103
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that MDA does not pre-empt common law tort and im-
plied warranty claims); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that negligent failure to warn claim was not pre-empted by MDA); Cham-
bers v. Osteonics Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding MDA did not
pre-empt Indiana law negligent manufacture claim); Reeves v. Acromed Corp., 103
F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding "unreasonably dangerous" claim regarding
device was not pre-empted by MDA); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F.3d
324, 326-27 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that state law failure to warn, breach of im-
plied warranty, negligence and strict liability claims were not pre-empted by MDA);
Sanders v. Optical Radiation Corp., No. 95-1967, 1996 WL 423124, at *2 (4th Cir.
July 30, 1996) (affirming in part and vacating and remanding based on Medtronic's
holding on pre-emption).
75. See, e.g., Duval4 103 F.3d 324 at 326 ("In light of the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, we hold that § 360k(a) does not preempt
Duvall's claims.").
76. See Wilson v. Bradlees, Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 553 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that
Flammable Fabrics Act did not pre-empt common-law products liability claims).
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A. Pre-Medtronic Cases in the Third Circuit
Because the Third Circuit's recent ruling in Bone Screw Litigation
reverses Third Circuit precedent, practitioners should not rely on earlier
cases. 77 The court has considered the issue of MDA pre-emption three
times since the MDA was enacted in 1976.78 In each case, the court found
plaintiffs' state law claims pre-empted by the express pre-emption provi-
sion of the MDA.79 In the earliest post-1976 case, however, the court al-
lowed common law tort claims to lie without explicitly deciding the pre-
emption issue.8 0 Decisions of district courts within the Third Circuit did
not send the clear message the Third Circuit panels had articulated. 8 '
B. Third Circuit Adopts Rule Announced in Medtronic: In re Orthopedic
Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation
The Third Circuit's recent ruling in response to Medtronic is narrow
but forceful.8 2 In Bone Screw Litigation, the court initially held that the
plaintiffs' fraud on the FDA theory of liability is not so unworkable that the
defendant was entitled to dismissal of all claims brought against it without
77. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 825 (3d
Cir. 1998) (finding Medtronic controlling and noting it overrules Third Circuit pre-
cedent "that would prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a cause of action for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation").
78. See English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1995) (considering
two issues on appeal: "(1) whether the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 pre-
empt their state law tort and contract claims against the manufacturer... and (2)
whether the Amendments also preempt these claims for a medical device cleared
for marketing under the 'substantial equivalence' exception .... "); Michael v.
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1319 (3d Cir. 1995) ("we must decide whether 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k pre-empts Nina Michael's state law causes of action for negligent manufac-
ture and design, strict product liability, breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of an express warranty, and common law fraud against
Shiley Inc."); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1994)
(responding to plaintiffs arguments that neither tort claims generally nor her spe-
cific claims are preempted under § 360k(a)).
79. See English, 67 F.3d at 483-84 (holding that breach of express warranty
claim not pre-empted because duties created by parties themselves, but FDA regu-
lations pre-empted state law claims of plaintiffs); Shiley, 46 F.3d at 1319 (holding
that MDA pre-empted tort claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of implied
warranty and fraud on FDA, even though MDA did not pre-empt state law contract
claims); Gile, 22 F.3d at 542-45 (finding patient's state law tort claims were pre-
empted under MDA).
80. See Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prod., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 581 (3d Cir. 1983)
(allowing negligence and products liability claims and suggesting implicit finding
that MDA does not pre-empt state law claims).
81. Compare Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 853 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (finding state law claims regarding pedicle screws not pre-empted by MDA),
with Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F. Supp. 744, 754 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (finding
pre-emption of state law failure to warn claim).
82. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 829 (beginning summary of conclu-
sion with statement "[o]ur holding is a narrow one").
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further demonstration of causation or lack thereof.8 3 In addition, the
court held that a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, such as the fraud on
the FDA claim brought against the defendant, would not be pre-empted
by the MDA.8 4 In this way, the court ruled that at least the state law tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation would not be pre-empted by this federal
statute.
Bone Screw Litigation involved over 2,000 individual plaintiffs who
claim to have suffered injuries directly related to orthopedic bone screws
that were implanted in the pedicles of their spines.8 5 The plaintiffs
brought products liability claims and claims based on civil conspiracy and
concert of action theories against several different defendants, including
the manufacturer, physicians, hospitals, professional associations and a
consulting firm.8 6 The actions were consolidated for pre-trial proceedings
pursuant to the multi-district litigation statute.8 7 At the time of the Third
Circuit's ruling on MDA pre-emption, the plaintiffs had dismissed most of
their claims against the physicians, hospitals and professional societies,
and the plaintiffs had reached a settlement agreement with AcroMed, the
manufacturer.8 8
The defendant in Bone Screw Litigation, Buckman, is a consulting com-
pany that had advised AcroMed during the FDA approval process for this
device.8 9 Plaintiffs claimed that Buckman's efforts on behalf of AcroMed
constituted misrepresentations to the FDA, which played a substantial role
83. See id. ("[T] he plaintiffs' 'fraud on the FDA' theory of liability is not so at
odds with traditional principles of tort law that Buckman is entitled to a dismissal
of all claims against it at this stage."); see also Joseph Slobodzian, 'OffLabel' Case
Setback: Court Reinstates Part of Fraud Claim Over IDA Misrepresentations, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 30, 1998, at B4 (focusing on fraud on FDA claim in recounting Third Cir-
cuit's recent ruling).
84. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 829 ("[Ihf the state law of fraudulent
misrepresentation applicable in one or more of these cases would impose liability
on Buckman in the circumstances alleged, that law would not be preempted by the
MDA."); see also Pedicle Screws: Divided 3rd Circuit Panel Reverses Fraud-on-FDA Claims
in Pedicle Case, 3 No. 23 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: DRUGS & MED. DEVICES 7 (Dec. 4,
1998) (summarizing Third Circuit's findings regarding pre-emption).
85. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 818 (providing history of multidistrict
litigation at issue in present case); Linda Mullenix, Federal Practice: Complex Litiga-
tion, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1998, at B10-11 (providing comprehensive background
and history on multidistrict litigation at issue in present case).
86. See Mullenix, supra note 85, at BIO-11 (providing comprehensive back-
ground and history on multidistrict litigation at issue in present case).
87. See id. (same).
88. See id. at Bll (detailing terms of plaintiffs' settlement with AcroMed).
89. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 820 (explaining Buckman's relation-
ship to AcroMed and consequent involvement in present litigation). Buckman
Company Incorporated's world wide web page describes the company accordingly,
"Buckman Company, Inc. (BCI) provides regulatory and clinical consulting serv-
ices to the medical device & biotechnology industries. Our skills and strengths are
recognized by FDA personnel and other members of the regulatory community."
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in the events resulting in their injuries; the specific claim was "fraud on
the FDA."90 The district court dismissed this claim as applied to Buck-
man, relying on Michael v. Shiley.9 1 After the Supreme Court's ruling in
Medtronic, the district court reaffirmed the dismissal on a defendant's mo-
tion.9 2 The court distinguished the negligence claim in Medtronic from
the fraud on the FDA claim in this case, explaining that the object of this
fraud was the FDA rather than the plaintiffs themselves. 9 3 Although the
court acknowledged that pre-emption would not be an appropriate
ground upon which the court could dismiss the plaintiffs' fraud claim, the
court found that the pre-emption issue did not arise in this case. 94 In-
stead, the court held that the claim should be dismissed because the MDA
does not provide a private right of action. 95
The Third Circuit reversed the district court.9 6 Initially, the court
found that there was no express pre-emption at issue, because the com-
mon law claim did not "conflict" with any federal law at issue.9 7 Next, the
court disagreed with the district court's finding that the MDA does not
provide a private cause of action.98 After demonstrating the error in the
lower court's reasoning, the Third Circuit proceeded to address the two
issues raised by Buckman in defense-the pre-emption and causation is-
90. See Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 818 (describing plaintiffs' specific alle-
gations against Buckman).
91. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1997
WL 305257, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1997) (giving detailed background of March
1995 pretrial order holding plaintiffs' fraud on FDA claims pre-empted by MDA).
92. See id. (reaffirming granted motion requesting dismissal of plaintiffs'
fraud on FDA claim).
93. See id. at *3 (analyzing pre-emption issue in light of Medtronic, stating that
finding FDA as object of fraud rather than plaintiffs themselves "transforms an
otherwise simple fraud claim that would not be preempted by the MDA according
to the reasoning of Lohr into one that is precluded by virtue of the fact that the
MDA does not provide for a private right of action").
94. See id. ("Hence, Lohr established that the doctrine of preemption would
be an inappropriate ground upon which the court should dismiss plaintiffs' fraud-
on-the-FDA claim, but it did not otherwise alter the court's ruling in Pretrial Order
No. 12.").
95. See id. (explaining affirmance of Pretrial Order No. 12).
96. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 819 (3d
Cir. 1998) ("We will reverse.").
97. See id. at 823 (finding, based on Medtronic ruling, that "there is no federal
'requirement' 'applicable to the device' at issue here; nor is there a state 'require-
ment' 'with respect to' that device" (quoting Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 500
(1996))).
98. See id. at 825 (relying on Supreme Court's ruling in Medtronic to disagree
with district court regarding existence of private right of action). The court stated,
"[r]efusing to entertain Buckman's fraudulent misrepresentation claim solely be-
cause the statutory scheme does not contain a private cause of action would be the
equivalent of finding preemption of state law claims contrary to the clear holding
of Lohr." Id. The court concluded, "[iun short, Lohr overrules everything in
Michael [v. Shiley] that would prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a cause of action for
fraudulent misrepresentation based on common law principles." Id.
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sues.99 More specifically, the court considered whether the MDA pre-
empts the fraud claim and whether the complaints sufficiently showed
causation of injury as a result of defendant's alleged
misrepresentations.10 0
Buckman raised several arguments to support that the MDA pre-
empts any state law claims; in reaction, the Third Circuit held that the
Supreme Court's rulings in Medtronic defeated each of them. 10 1 First, the
court considered the defendant's efforts to distinguish this case from Med-
tronic.10 2 Buckman argued that because the fraud on the FDA claim per-
tained to FDA approval procedures, rather than a claim regarding the
product itself, Medtronic should not be controlling.10 3 Further, Buckman
distinguished Medtronic because the FDA itself-the very agency responsi-
ble for enforcing the MDA-has been the object of the fraud.10 4 In re-
sponding to these arguments the court relied on the MDA.10 5 The court
disagreed with Buckman's arguments and found them "simply
unpersuasive."1
06
The court proceeded to address the pre-emption issue from a broader
perspective, acknowledging that the MDA may certainly pre-empt state law
claims when there are "clear and direct conflicts between the require-
ments of state law and those of the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]."'°7
The court warned that this pre-emption provision in combination with
99. See id. at 825-26 (addressing defendant's pre-emption argument and alter-
native argument that complaints do not state claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation).
100. See id. (considering each of defendant Buckman's pre-emption argu-
ments and turning to causation issue). Because this Casebrief is focused on the
issue of MDA pre-emption, I limit my analysis to the pertinent portion of the
opinion.
101. See id. at 825 ("Buckman advances a number of preemption arguments
in addition to the one adopted by the district court. In each instance, we conclude
that [Medtronic] counsels rejection.").
102. See id. at 825-26 ("In the context of the text of that section as construed
in [Medtronic], Buckman's suggested distinctions are simply unpersuasive.").
103. See id. at 825 (distinguishing Medtronic because claim pertains to FDA
procedures rather than product itself).
104. See id. (arguing further that Medtronic is not controlling "because the tar-
get of the alleged fraud here is 'a creature of statute' which has the sole responsi-
bility for enforcing the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] and the regulation
promulgated thereunder").
105. See id. at 825-26 ("Once again, we look first to Congress' express message
concerning preemption-§ 360k.").
106. See id. at 826 ("In the context of the text of that section as construed in
Lohr, Buckman's suggested distinctions are simply unpersuasive."). The court ac-
knowledged that a distinction can certainly be drawn between FDA procedures
and substantive requirements when ruling on pre-emption, noting "[i]ndeed,
given that there must be state and federal requirements with respect to a device, it
is harder to argue preemption under § 360k based on FDA procedures than based
on FDA substantive requirements for a regulated device." Id.
107. Id. at 826 (allowing for pre-emption under § 360k in circumstances of
direct conflict with state law).
[Vol. 44: p. 873
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Medtronic's presumption against pre-emption in areas of traditional state
concern suggests a reluctance to find implied pre-emption.10 8 Continu-
ing, Buckman advanced the general theory that suits alleging common law
fraud in the FDA approval process are simply inconsistent with the alloca-
tion of authority and procedures established by the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act.10 9 The court responded sharply, stating "[w]e see no
inconsistency between the FDA having the exclusive prerogative of bring-
ing actions to enforce the FDCA and preserving the right of people in the
plaintiffs' position to bring common law fraudulent misrepresentation
claims."110 Additionally, the court noted that judicial review would in no
way duplicate, replace or second-guess the FDA's procedures.1 1 '
Although the court, in conclusion, noted that its holding in Bone Screw
Litigation is "a narrow one," this ruling on the pre-emptive effect of the
MDA is quite clear.112 In its analysis of Medtronic, the Third Circuit em-
108. See id. ("The existence of § 360k, its relatively narrow scope, and [Med-
tronic v.] Lohrs presumption against preemption of areas traditionally occupied by
state law, however, counsel caution in finding implied preemption where no ex-
press preemption exists.").
109. See id. ("Here, appellees' argument boils down to a contention that the
litigation of suits of this kind is fundamentally inconsistent with the regulatory pro-
cess established by the FDCA.").
110. Id.
111. See id. ("Moreover, we do not share appellees' apparent perception that
litigation of such claims holds the potential for courts and juries second-guessing
the FDA."). The court continued, "Indeed, there is ample precedent, in related
contexts, to support a claim premised on misrepresentations made to a federal
agency." Id.
112. In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 98-1762, 98-1829,
1999 WL 796833, at *8 (3d Cir. Oct. 7, 1999) (restating its adoption of Medtronic
rule in 1998 bone screw litigation, "[I] n Bone Screw I, we interpreted Medtronic to
mean that common law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation are not preempted
by the MDA, even if the conduct underlying those claims violated the FDCA."). In
this later, separate appeal as part of the bone screw MDL, plaintiffs appealed the
district court's dismissal of the conspiracy and concert of action claims. See id.
Plaintiffs argued that the holdings in Medtronic and Bone Screw I suggest that the
district court erred in dismissing claims of conspiracy to violate the FDCA. See id.
The Third Circuit disagreed with this argument, distinguishing its earlier holding:
Medtronic and Bone Screw I are crucially different from this case, however.
Both raised the issue whether state common law claims were preempted
by the FDCA and Medical Device Amendments. After Medtronic, it is clear
that such claims survive, and Bone Screw Iso held. Consequently, state law
claims such as negligence, breach of implied warranty, and fraudulent
misrepresentation are viable, even to the extent they seek recovery for
conduct that may also have violated the FDCA. But neither Medtronic nor
Bone Screw I purports to allow private plaintiffs to sue directly for viola-
tions of a federal statute in the absence of a separate underlying cause of
action. They merely hold that such causes of action as previously existed
under state law were not preempted by the FDCA and Medical Device
Amendments.
Id.; see Fraud-On-FDA: Divided 3rd Circuit Panel Reverses Fraud-on-FDA Claims in Pedicle
Case, 2 No. 2 MEaLEm's Lmc. REP.: FEN-PHEN/REDuX 25 (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter Fraud-On-FDA] (reporting pedicle screw decision and noting its possible impact
on diet drug litigation accordingly, "Editor's Note: Although this is not a diet drug
1999]
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phasized the limited effect of the MDA in the face of "the general obliga-
tions imposed by the state common law."' 13 Although the holding in Bone
Screw Litigation addresses exclusively the plaintiffs' fraud on the FDA claim,
the Third Circuit gave no indication that its holding might not be ex-
tended to allow any state law claims based on tort and contract theories, so
long as such claims do not directly conflict with provisions of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 114 Indeed, the court read the MDA and under-
stood the Supreme Court's ruling in Medtronic to require nearly express
pre-emption. 115 A defendant simply could no longer raise Buckman's ar-
guments because the Third Circuit has followed the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Medtronic and overruled Third Circuit precedent to the contrary.1 6
C. Implications of Bone Screw Litigation
The Third Circuit's recent pronouncement could have significant ef-
fects on product liability litigation involving drugs and medical devices in
the circuit.1 17 In addition, this ruling may have collateral effects on litiga-
tion regarding other federally regulated substances, such as pesticides, as
has occurred in other circuits. 1 8 There are two perspectives on the effect
that Medtronic might have on consumers, and these potential effects can be
applied by analogy to the Third Circuit. 119
case, the issues involving fraud allegations are significant and coverage is provided
as a service to our readers").
113. Bone Screw Litigation, 159 F.3d at 823 (analyzing Supreme Court's holding
in Medtronic). The court noted, "[t] he general obligations imposed by the state
common law relied upon by Lohr were no more a threat to federal requirements
than would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention regulations and
zoning codes, or to use due care in the training and supervision of a workforce."
Id.
114. See id. at 829 (including no language limiting pre-emption holding to
fraudulent misrepresentation).
115. See id. at 826 (agreeing with general principles of Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Medtronic and suggesting MDA pre-empts no tort claims).
116. See id. at 824-25 (disagreeing with each of Buckman's arguments and
holding in particular that Medtronic precludes agreeing with Buckman's pre-emp-
tion arguments).
117. See Fraud-On-FDA, supra note 112, at 25 (reporting pedicle screw deci-
sion and noting its possible impact on diet drug litigation accordingly, "Editor's
Note: Although this is not a diet drug case, the issues involving fraud allegations
are significant and coverage is provided as a service to our readers").
118. See, e.g., Symens v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 152 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that state law claims were pre-empted by Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service Regulations); Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co., 131
F.3d 656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that manufacturer might argue that Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act pre-empted claims), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1839 (1998); Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559, 564-65
(1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
pre-empted builder's failure to warn claims); Wilson v. Bradlees, Inc., 96 F.3d 552,
553 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Flammable Fabrics Act did not pre-empt com-
mon-law products liability claims).
119. Compare Gelsinger, supra note 8, at 682 (criticizing Medtronic ruling and
noting "the Court appears to have overlooked the tremendous public benefit
[Vol. 44: p. 873
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One point of view posits that the possibility of liability harms consum-
ers through its deterrent effect on drug and device development and mar-
keting. 120 The financial risk of tort actions involving drugs and devices
approved and regulated by the FDA may cause drug companies to alter
their long-term business planning.12 1 Further, tort actions involving FDA-
regulated drug products have at times caused manufacturers to discon-
tinue production of their approved products, such as the CU-7 Intrauter-
ine device and childhood vaccines. 122
gleaned from advances in the medical devices field. Under the particular circum-
stances of the Medtronic case, the Court's individualistic view of public health and
safety could have a devastating effect on the medical devices industry and, in turn,
on the public at large."), with KennethJ. Witzel, Comment, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
and the Power of Preemption: A Pennsylvania Guide to the Preemption of Common Law
Tort Claims by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 102 DICK. L. REv. 865, 878
(1998) ("Medtronic serves to reopen an avenue of relief for injured device recipi-
ents that has not been available for many recipients in recent years.").
120. See Donato & Neraas, supra note 2, at 318-19 (arguing for pre-emptive
effect of MDA and asserting "these courts [that do not find pre-emption] ignore
public policy which favors a finding of implied federal preemption in the drug
area"); Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compli-
ance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1482 (1994) ("Concerns have
been raised, however, that the tort process, because of its uncertain standards, pro-
duces the unintended consequence of discouraging worthwhile innovation. Pre-
scription drug manufacturers maintain that liability risks may cut into their
innovative efforts."); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Cor-
porations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 325-27 (1998) (asserting
that punitive damage awards suppress innovation).
For further discussion on the effect of pre-emption on the drug industry, see
Thomas Scarlett, The Relationship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug Label-
ing, Product Liability, and Federal Preemption, 46 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 31, 37-38
(1991) (expressing serious concern about effects of multi-million dollar product
liability awards on pharmaceutical production).
121. See Scarlett, supra note 120, at 38 (demonstrating effect of multi-million
dollar liability awards on drug production). One commentator states:
It does not take many such awards before there is a real possibility that
the process for developing, approving, and regulating drugs will be af-
fected in undesirable ways.
Among the visible effects of large product liability awards, actual or
threatened, is the discontinuation of specific products. A less visible, but
probably real, effect is to deflect drug development away from product
categories in which large judgments have made anticipated revenues
seem too small to justify the investment necessary to bring a product to
market.
Id.
122. See Donato & Neraas, supra note 2, at 318-19 (noting effect of tort actions
on market distribution of Bendectin, CU-7 intrauterine devices and childhood vac-
cines); Viscusi, supra note 120, at 326 (demonstrating relationship between puni-
tive damage awards and vaccine production, price and use). For example, when
childhood vaccine manufacturers halted production of certain vaccines following
several costly tort actions, the vaccine supply decreased so significantly that the
nation's immunization supply was put in jeopardy. See Donato & Neraas, supra
note 2, at 318-19. In a footnote, the commentators observed, "[this vaccine liabil-
ity crisis prompted Congress to pass the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
which established the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, a no-fault
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Another perspective suggests that this threat of liability is favorable to
consumers.1 23 According to this theory, Medtronic has enabled injured
consumers to bring common law tort suits against manufacturers and
counter manufacturers' pre-emption defense under the MDA.124 The en-
suing benefit to consumers is therefore two-fold: first, the injured have
greater opportunity for redress, and second, it may be presumed that man-
ufacturers will seek to produce safer products when threatened with dam-
ages to this degree. 12 5
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the Third Circuit's recent ruling in Bone Screw Litiga-
tion, the effect on consumers as well as pharmaceutical and medical device
manufacturers has yet to be determined. The fact that litigation strategy
will be altered, however, by both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel is
quite certain. 12 6
Elizabeth G. Harkins
nontort compensation alternative for individuals injured by compulsory childhood
immunization." Id. at 319 n.94.
123. See Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 268 (crediting Supreme Court's ruling in
Medtronic with providing increased safety for consumers).
124. See id. (attributing change in litigation landscape for consumers to Med-
tronic); Witzel, supra note 119, at 879-86 (citing examples of medical device cases
that "demonstrate how the Supreme Court's ruling in Medtronic has resulted in
eventual relief for some victims and their families").
125. See Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 268 (explaining benefit to consumers
not simply from litigation perspective but also from improved manufacturing tech-
niques); Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the "Crazy Quilt" of Cipollone: A Di-
vided Court Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
75 N.C. L. REv. 1440, 1495-96 (1997) ("The holding of Medtronic clearly means that
most plaintiffs' claims will not be preempted by the MDA. Until Medtronic, the
preemption defense carried many defendants' summary judgment motions in the
federal district courts."); Witzel, supra note 119, at 878-79 (asserting that Medtronic
ruling provides incentive to produce safer products and strictly comply with FDA
procedures).
126. See, e.g., Tumidolsky, supra note 1, at 268 (noting dramatic effect of Med-
tronic on federal product liability actions); Angela Woodley Kronenberg, Note,
King v. Collagen Corporation: FDA Approval Insulates Medical Device Manufacturers
From State Common Law Liability, 11 J. CoNTEmP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 565 (1995)
(explaining effect of King on medical device litigation on First Circuit); see also
Brad Kenneth Lindow, Recent Case, Medical Device Amendments Act Does Not Preempt
All State Law Claims, 10 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 32, 32-33 (1998) (demonstrating
effect of similar Seventh Circuit ruling pursuant to Medtronic).
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